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Abolition of the Insanity Defense
Violates Due Process
Stephen

J.
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This article, which is based on and expands on an amicus brief the authors submitted to the United States Supreme
Court, first provides the moral argument in favor of the insanity defense. It considers and rejects the most
important moral counterargument and suggests that jurisdictions have considerable leeway in deciding what test
best meets their legal and moral policies. The article then discusses why the two primary alternatives to the insanity
defense, the negation of mens rea and considering mental disorder at sentencing, are insufficient to achieve the goal
of responding justly to severely mentally disordered offenders. The last section considers and rejects standard
practical arguments in favor of abolishing the insanity defense.
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In November 2012, the Supreme Court declined to
grant certiorari in an Idaho case, Delling v. Idaho, 1
which urged the Court to consider whether the Due
Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution require all jurisdictions to retain some
form of the insanity defense. Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented from
the denial of certiorari.
Idaho abolished the insanity defense in the early
1980s and instead permits defendants to introduce
evidence of mental disorder solely for the purpose of
negating the mens rea required by the definition of
the crime charged. John Joseph Delling had paranoid
schizophrenia and believed that his victims were
stealing his essence by shrinking his brain and that he
had to kill them to save his life. He carefully planned
the killings and succeeded. Mr. Delling clearly
formed the intent to kill, the mens rea required for
murder, but the judge also explicidy found that he
was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conDr. Morse is Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law and
Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry, Universiry of Pennsylvania Law School and Department of Psychiatry, Universiry of Pennsylvania Medical School, Philadelphia, PA. Professor Bonnie is Harrison Foundation Professor ofLaw and M edicine and Director, Institute
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duct due to his severe mental illness. No insanity
defense was available, and he was therefore convicted
of murder. Consequently, the validity of his conviction turned squarely on whether an independent insanity defense is constitutionally required.
We submitted an amicus brief in Delling on behalf
of 52 law professors, urging the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari and to decide the constitutional question in Mr. Delling's favor. In the course of his brief
dissent, Justice Breyer referred to the "Law Professors' brief," as well as an amicus brief submitted by
the American Psychiatric Association and the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, in support
of granting certiorari. In the Law Professors' brief, we
argued that the affirmative defense of legal insanity
has such a strong historical, moral, and practical pedigree and is so ubiquitous that providing some form
of an insanity defense is a matter of fundamental
fairness in a just society. It gives doctrinal expression
to fundamental moral and legal principles that have
been recognized by the common law for centuries
and that the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged. Jurisdictions have substantial leeway in deciding what test best meets their legal and moral policies, but some form of affirmative defense is "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental" as a principle of
substantive justice (Ref. 2, p 105), and, accordingly,
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required by the Due Process Clause. In this article,
we present and elaborate upon these arguments.
The first section provides the moral argument in
favor of the insanity defense. Then it considers and
rejects the most important moral counterargument.
Finally, it suggests that jurisdictions have considerable leeway in deciding what test best meets their
legal and moral policies. The second section discusses
why the two primary alternatives to the insanity defense, the negation of mens rea and considering mental disorder at sentencing, are insufficient to achieve
the goal of responding justly to severely mentally
disordered offenders. The last section considers and
rejects standard practical arguments in favor of abolishing the insanity defense.

Why the Insanity Defense Is
Constitutionally Required
This section provides the positive argument in favor of the moral necessity of providing an insanity
defense, considers the primary counterargument,
and concludes with discussion of what test is
required.

The Moral Necessity of the Defense of Legal
Insanity
Blame and punishment by the state are fundamentally unfair and thus a violation of the Due Process
Clause if an offender was not responsible for his
crime. The affirmative defense of legal insanity applies this fundamental principle by excusing those
mentally disordered offenders whose disorder deprived them of rational understanding of their conduct at the time of the crime. 3- 5 This principle is
simple but profound. Indeed, in recognition of it, the
insanity defense has been a feature of ancient law and
of English law since the 14th century. 6 - 8 1t was universal in the United States until the last decades of the
20th century, and there is still a near consensus
among state and federal lawmakers that the defense
must be retained. 9
The concept of responsibility connects with our
most fundamental convictions about human nature
and dignity and our everyday experience of guilt and
innocence and blame and punishment. It also explains our common aversion to the idea that we
might simply be like machines responding to neural
activities in the brain and our resistance to thinking
of all wrongdoing as sickness. Failing to provide an

insanity defense confounds the meaning of what it is
to be responsible for one's actions. It cheapens the
idea of being a responsible person by classifYing and
holding responsible persons intuitively regarded as
fundamentally nonresponsible.
In both law and morals, the capacity for reason is
the primary foundation for responsibility and competence. The precise cognitive deficit a person must
exhibit can, of course, vary from context to context.
In the criminal justice system, an offender who lacks
the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his
actions as the result of severe mental disorder does
not deserve full blame and punishment and must be
excused in a sufficiently extreme case. Moreover,
such offenders cannot be appropriately deterred because the rules oflaw and morality cannot adequately
guide them. Failing to excuse some mentally disordered offenders is inconsistent with both retributive
and deterrent theories of just punishment.
A similar baseline principle explains the many
competence doctrines employed in the criminal justice process. This Court has long recognized that, at
every stage, justice demands that some people with
severe mental abnormalities must be treated differently from those without substantial mental impairment, because some impaired defendants are incapable of reason and understanding in a specific context.
Competence to stand trial, 10 competence to plead
guilty and to waive counsel, I I competence to reRresent oneself, 12 and competence to be executed 3 ' 14
are all examples in which the Constitution requires
such special treatment. It is unfair to the defendant
and offensive to the dignity of criminal justice to
treat people without understanding as if their understanding was unimpaired. Evidence of mental disorder is routinely introduced in all these contexts to
determine whether the defendant must be accorded
special treatment.
Legally insane offenders are not excused solely because they had a severe mental disorder at the time of
the crime. The mental disorder must also impair
their ability to understand or appreciate that what
they are doing is wrong or some other functional
capacity that a jurisdiction believes is crucial to responsibility. The criminal acts of those found legally
insane do not result from bad judgment, insufficient
moral sense, bad attitudes, or bad characters, none of
which is an excusing condition. Rather, the crimes of
legally insane offenders arise from a lack of understanding produced by severe mental abnormality and
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thus they do not reflect culpable personal qualities
and actions. To convict such people offends the basic
sense of justice.
The impact of mental disorder on an offender's
responsibility and competence is recognized
throughout criminal law. Even the few jurisdictions
that have abolished the insanity defense recognize
that mental disorder affects criminal responsibility
because it permits the introduction of evidence of
mental disorder to negate the mens rea for the crime
charged. 15 · 16 As the Supreme Court has recognized,
state infliction of stigmatization and punishment is a
severe infringement (Ref. 17, pp 363-4). The insanity defense is grounded in long-recognized legal and
moral principles and on routinely admissible evidence. Even if a defendant formed the charged mens
rea, it is unfair to preclude a defendant from claiming
and proving that he was not at fault as a result oflack
of understanding arising from a severely disordered
mind. That is precisely the issue D elling raised.
Historical practice, the near universal acceptance
of the need for an independent affirmative defense of
legal insanity, and the fundamental unfairness of
blaming and punishing legally insane offenders provide the strongest reasons to conclude that fundamental fairness and the Due Process C lause require
an insanity defense. Abolishing this narrowly defined
and deeply rooted defense could plausibly be justified only if an alternative legal approach could reach
the same just result or if irremediably deep flaws preclude fair and accurate administration of the defense.
The next two main sections show that there are no
such alternatives and that the defense is no more
vulnerable to risks of mistake and abuse than any
other disputed issue in the penal law.

Response to the Counterargument
The late Norval Morris presented the most recent,
important, nonconsequentialist argument for abolishing the insanity defense in his book, M adness and
the Criminal Law. 18 Professor Morris suggested numerous consequentialist arguments for rejecting the
insanity defense, but, believing in desert as a limiting
principle in criminal law, he confronted directly "the
question of fairness, the sense that it is unjust and
unfair to stigm atize the mentally ill as criminals and
to pun ish them for their crimes" (Ref. 18, p 6 1). In
brief, M orris argued that other causes, such as social
disadvantage, are far more criminogenic than mental
disorder (including severe disorder); yet, h e pointed
490

out, we do not excuse those who are poor or the
products of broken homes. Morris concluded, " [a]s
a rational matter it is hard to see why ~ne should
be more responsible for what is done to one than
for what one is" (Ref. 18, p 63). This conclusion is
surely correct. It does not follow from the argument
presented for it, however, which makes a morally
irrelevant comparison between socially disadvantaged persons and persons with severe mental
disorders.
Morris confuses causation with excuse, a confusion that has consistently bedeviled clear thinking
about criminal responsibility. Causation is not per se
an excusing condition in criminal law. All behavior is
caused, even if we are often ignorant of the causes. If
causation were an excuse, no one would be held responsible for any behavior, criminal or not. Moreover, causation is not the equivalent of the subspecies
of the genuine excuse that we term compulsion.
Compulsion exists when the person faces a regrettable hard choice that leaves him with no reasonable
alternative to wrongdoing. We also som etimes say
that people are compelled if they yield to an internal
desire that they find it extremely difficult to resist.
Again, if causation were the equivalent of compulsion, no one would be responsible, because all behavior would be compelled. Causation is not the question; nonculpable lack of reason and compulsion are
the genuine excusing conditions.
Consider the case of a person whose extreme irrationality stems from the unknowing ingestion of a
powerful hallucinogen. Such a defendant, who is not
responsible for the ingestion of the drug, is not held
responsible for a consequent crime. How can we distinguish this case from that of a person who commits
a crime in response to motivations produced by severe mental disorder, say, a sudden command hallucination buttressed by a consistent delusional belief
that the action is n ecessary? Mentally disordered defendants who are not responsible for their condition
should also be excused. In both cases, the defendant
is excused not because the b eh avior was caused- all
behavior is caused- but because the defendant was
sufficiently irrational and was not responsible for the
irrationality.
The reason we do not excuse most disadvantaged
criminals (or those whose criminal behavior can b e
explained by other powerful causes) is not because w e
lack sympathy for their unfortunate backgrounds or
because we fail to recognize that social disadvantage
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is a powerful cause of crime, as it surely is. Rather,
most disadvantaged defendants are held responsible
because they possess minimal reason and are not
compelled to offend. A disadvantaged defendant
whose stress causes him to be mentally disordered
will be excused because he is disordered, not because
the abnormal mental state is caused by disadvantage.
Similarly, most mentally disordered persons are held
responsible for acts influenced by their disorders because they retain sufficient reason to meet the low
threshold standards for responsibility. In sum, the
criteria for moral autonomy and responsibility are
the capacity for reason and lack of compulsion,
whereas the criteria for excuses are that the person is
nonculpably lacking the capacity for reason or 1s
compelled.
The Test for Legal Insanity

Like the amicus brief filed on behalf of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the American
Academy ofPsychiatry and the Law (AAPL), the Law
Professors' brief did not endorse any particular test of
insanity. This perspective is in keeping with the Supreme Court's long-standing reluctance to intrude
too deeply into the sphere of state policymaking regarding the substantive criminal law. As Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas said:
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the
collection of interlocking and overlapping concepts which
the common law has utilized to assess the moral accountability of an individual for his antisocial deeds. The doctrines of actus reus, mem rea, insanity, mistake, justification,
and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the
evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious,
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of
man. This process of adjustment has always been thought
to be the province of the States [Ref. 19, 535-6].

At the same time, the Law Professors' brief, like
the APN APPL brief, identified the core content of
the traditional insanity defense as the incapacity to
understand the wrongfulness of one's actions. 20 In
one form or another, this deficit best explains the
various tests adopted by 46 states and the federal
criminal code. How . such lack of understanding
should be defined doctrinally and whether more controversial control tests21 ' 22 should be adopted at all
are matters within the province of the states and the
federal government.

Alternatives to the Insanity Defense Are
Not Morally Adequate

This section first addresses the mens rea alternative
and then considers sentencing.
The Mens Rea Alternative

The negation of mens rea and the affirmative defense of legal insanity are different claims that avoid
liability by different means and trigger different outcomes. The former denies the prima facie case of the
crime charged; the latter is an affirmative defense that
avoids liability in those cases in which the prima facie
case is established. The postverdict consequences are
also different. The former leads to outright acquittal;
the latter results in some form of involuntary civil
commitment. The two different claims are not substitutes for one another.
The primary reason that permitting a defendant to
introduce evidence of mental disorder to negate mens
rea cannot replace the affirmative defense of legal
insanity to achieve justice is that the mens rea alternative is based on a mistaken view of how severe
mental disorder affects human behavior. In virtually
all cases, mental disorder, even severe disorders
marked by psychotic symptoms such as delusions
and hallucinations, does not negate the required
mens rea for the crime charged23 (Ref. 5, p 933). It is
difficult to prove a negative, but cases, especially
those involving serious crime, in which the mens rea
for every offense charged is negated are extremely
rare. Rather, mental disorder affects a person's reasons for action. A mentally disordered defendant's
irrationally distorted beliefs, perceptions, or desires
typically and paradoxically give him the motivation
to form the mens rea required by the charged offense.
They usually do not interfere with the ability to perform the necessary actions to achieve irrationally motivated aims.
Consider the following typical examples beginning with Daniel M'Naughten himself.2 4 In
MNaughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843),
M'Naughten delusionally believed that the ruling
Tory party was persecuting and intended to kill him
(Ref. 25, p 10). As a result, he formed the belief that
he needed to assassinate Prime Minister Peel to end
the threat. He therefore formed the intention to kill
Peel. Thus M'Naughten would have been convicted
of murder if a defense of legal insanity had not been
available. Indeed, his case has come to stand for one
of the rules enunciated by the House ofLords, that a
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defendant should be acquitted on grounds of insanity if he "was laboring under such a defect of reason,
from a disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know
it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong" (Ref. 24, p 722). For a more contemporary
example, consider the case ofAndrea Yates, the Texas
woman who drowned her five children in a bathtub.
She delusionally believed that she was corrupting her
children and that unless she killed them, they would
be tortured in Hell for all eternity?6 She therefore
formed the intention to kill them. Indeed, she
planned the homicides carefully. Ms. Yates was
nonetheless acquitted by reason of insaniry because
she did not know that what she was doing was wrong.
Even if she narrowly knew the law of Texas and her
neighbors' mores, she thought the homicides were
fully justified by the eternal good of the children
under the circumstances. If only society knew what
she knew, they would approve of her conduct as justified. For a fmal example, suppose an offender with
aural hallucinations believes that he is hearing God's
voice or delusionally believes that God is communicatin9 with him and that God is commanding him to
kill. 2 If the offender kills in response to this command hallucination or delusion, he surely forms the
intent to kill to obey the divine decree. Nonetheless,
it would be unjust to punish this defendant, because
he, roo, does not know right from wrong, given his
beliefs, for which he is not responsible.
In all three cases, one could also claim that the
defendants did not know what they were doing in a
fundamental sense, because the most material reason
for action, what motivated them to form m ens rea,
was based on a delusion or hallucination that was the
irrational product of a disordered mind. N evertheless, in all three cases, the defendants' instrumental
rationality, the ability rationally to achieve their
ends, was intact despite their severe disorders. T hey
were able to carry out their disordered plans
effectively.
Mr. Delling's case is consistent with this most typical pattern of legal insanity claims in which the defendant clearly had the mens rea required by the definition of the crime but lacked capacity to
understand or appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct. He indisputably had a major mental disorder, paranoid schizophrenia, and as a result, delusionally believed that his victims were stealing his
powers and would thereby kill him. He therefore
492

believed that he needed to kill the victims to save his
own life. His grossly delusional belief was the cause of
his formation of the intent to kill. It is afso undisputed that he carefully planned his victims' deaths
and learned from one failed attempt. Such evidence
of his instrumental rationality is consistent with having such delusional beliefs. The trial judge explicitly
found that Mr. Delling did not know right from
wrong under the circumstances. Nonetheless, he was
convicted of murder because legal insanity was unavailable as a defense.
Mr. Delling was not a morally responsible agent.
He was completely out of touch with reality concerning his victims and the actions necessary to save his
own life. He did not deserve blame and punishment
for his murders. He is no more to blame than someone with dementia, for example, who acts on the
basis of similarly disordered beliefs. It is true, of
course, that Mr. Delling poses a genuine threat to
social safety as long as he remains deluded, but commitment after an insanity acquittal is more than sufficient to protect public safety, as 46 states and the
federal jurisdiction have recognized by having commitment statutes that require acquittees to prove
their suitability for release and that establish tightly
controlled programs of community supervision
when the acquittees are released.
To further understand the injustice of the mens rea
alternative, consider a case in which mens rea may
plausibly be negated. Suppose a defendant charged
with murder claims that he delusionally believed that
his obviously human victim of a shooting was in
reality a rag doll. If that were true, the defendant did
not intentionally kill a human being. Indeed, in a
mens rea alternative jurisdiction, he could not be convicted of purposely, knowingly, or recklessly killing a
human being, because his delusional beliefs negated
all three mental states. Mter all, he fully believed that
he was shooting at a rag doll, not a human being. The
defendant would be convicted of negligent homicide, however, because the standard for negligence is
objective reasonableness and the motivating belief
was patently unreasonable.
Of course, convicting the severely disordered defendant of a crime on the basis of a negligence standard is fundamentally unjust, as even Mr. Justice
Holmes recognized in his rightly famous essays on
the common law (Ref. 28, pp 50 - 1). The defendant's unreasonable mistake was not an ordinary
mistake caused by inattention, carelessness, or the
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like. Defendants are responsible for the latter, because we believe that they have the capacity to behave
more reasonably by being more careful or attentive.
In contrast, the hypothetical defendant's delusional
mistake was the product of a disordered mind, and
thus he had no insight and no ability to recognize the
gross distortion of reality. He was a victim of his
disorder, not someone who deserves blame and punishment as a careless perpetrator of manslaughter. He
does not deserve any blame and punishment, and
only the defense of legal insanity could achieve this
appropriate result. Paradoxically, such a defendant's
potential future dangerousness if he remains deluded
would be better addressed by an insanity acquittal
and indefinite involuntary commitment than by the
comparatively short, determinate sentences for involuntary manslaughter.
Thus, the mens rea alternative is not an acceptable
replacement or substitute for the insanity defense.
Only in the exceedingly rare case in which mental
disorder negates all mens rea would the equivalent
justice of a full acquittal be achieved, albeit for a
different reason; but again, this is the rarest of cases.
Most legally insane offenders form the mens rea required by the definition of the charged offense, and
only the defense of legal insanity can respond justly
to their blameworthiness. Finally, a defendant who
negated all mens rea would be entitled to outright
release and subject only to traditional involuntary
civil commitment, which is far less protective of public safety than postinsanity acquittal commitment.

Sentencing
Consideration of mental disorder for purposes of
assessing both mitigation and aggravation is a staple
ofboth capital and noncapital sentencing, but it is no
substitute for the affirmative defense oflegal insanity.
On moral grounds, it is unfair to blame and punish a
defendant who deserves no blame and punishment at
all, even if the offender's sentence is reduced. Blaming and punishing in such cases is unjust. Sentencing
judges might also use mental disorder as an aggravating consideration, as occurred in Delling, because it
might suggest that the defendant is especially dangerous as a result. Thus, sentences of severely mentally ill
offenders might not be reduced or might even be
enhanced. Again, injustice would result, and public
safety would not be protected as well as an indeterminate postacquittal commitment would achieve.
Third, unless a sentencing judge is required by law to

consider mental disorder at sentencing, whether the
judge does so will be entirely discretionary. Again,
this is a potential source of profound injustice if the
sentencing judge fails to consider severe mental disorder in an appropriate case. In short, only a required
insanity defense would ensure that arguably blameless mentally disordered offenders have an opportunity to establish that the stated blame and punishment are not justified.

Practical Objections to the Insanity
Defense are Inconsequential
Several objections to the insanity defense have
been raised by proponents of abolition, including
those in Idaho, bur they are insubstantial and provide
not even a rational basis for abolishing a defense with
such a profound historical, moral, and legal basis.
They certainly cannot survive a more searching analysis. In general, these objections relate to supposed
difficulties of administering the insanity defense
fairly and accurately. Specific objections include that
administering the defense requires an assessment of
the defendant's past mental state using controversial
psychiatric and psychological evidence, a task that is
too difficult; acquitting insane defendants endangers
public safety; the defense produces wrong verdicts;
and defendants use it to beat the rap.

Assessing Past Mental State Using Psychological
and Psychiatric Evidence
It is often difficult to reconstruct past mental states
and, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, psychological and psychiatric evidence can be problematic (Refs. 9, p 740 -1 ; 29, p 413). Nevertheless, if all
jurisdictions, including mens rea alternative jurisdictions, concede the necessity of proving mens rea (for
most crimes) before punishment may justly be imposed, then their argument against the insanity defense based on the difficulty of reconstructing past
mental states must fail unless assessing past intent,
knowledge, and other types of mens rea is easier than
assessing whether the defendant was acting under the
influence of severely abnormal mental states. After
all, both mens rea and legal insanity refer to past
mental states that must be inferred from the defendant's actions, including utterances. The severe disorder that is necessary for practical support of an
insanity defense is in most cases easier to prove than
ordinary mens rea. Despite the problems with mental
health evidence, all but four jurisdictions believe that
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assessing legal insanity at the time of the crime with
mental health evidence is feasible. Indeed, it is routine. Moreover, the abolitionist jurisdictions permit
introduction of such evidence to negate mens rea.
Unless abolitionist jurisdictions are prepared to argue-and none has-that assessing mens rea with
mental health evidence is uniquely reliable, the argument based on the deficiencies of mental health evidence lacks credibility. Indeed, one could claim that
the severe disorder that is practically necessary to support an insanity defense is easier to prove than ordinary mens rea because it is, by definition, obvious.
Finally, mental health evidence is routinely admitted
in a vast array of civil and criminal contexts, including all the criminal competencies and sentencing.

Public Safety
As previously argued, the insanity defense poses no
danger to public safety. Successful insanity defenses
are so rare that deterrence will not be undermined,
because few legally sane defendants will believe that
they can avoid conviction by manipulatively and
falsely raising the defense. More important, every
jurisdiction provides for commitment to a secure
mental facility after a defendant has been acquitted
by reason of insanity and the Supreme Court has
approved the constitutionality of indefinite confinement (with periodic review) of such acquittees as
long as they remain mentally disordered and dangerous?0·31 (Ref. 5, p 932). Further, the Supreme Court
has approved procedures for the commitments that
are more onerous for acquittees than standard civil
commitment. 30 It is of course true that acquittees
may be released earlier than if they had been convicted and imprisoned, but there is no evidence that
released ac'\uittees pose a special danger to the
community. 2- 36

Wrong Verdicts
Another objection is that the insanity defense is
especially prone to erroneous verdicts. This objection
is unwarranted.
There is no evidence that the factual determinations concerning whether a defendant has a severe
mental disorder incapacitating him from understanding the wrongfulness of his conduct are especially prone to error. Expert evidence on these concerns is routinely admitted and is subject to the usual
rules of cross-examination.
494

The ultimate value judgments that the insanity
defense requires, such as the question of whether the
defendant is incapable of understanding the wrongfulness of his conduct, are no more intractable or
unreliable than the many other value judgments that
the criminal law asks finders of fact to make, such as
whether the defendant grossly deviated from the
standard of care to be expected of a reasonable person, or whether an intentional killer was reasonably
provoked. In our American system of justice, it is
entirely appropriate to leave to the jury considerable
discretion to judge, in light of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case, whether the defendant's mental disorder undermined his criminal responsibility. Drawing the line between guilt and
innocence is the task of the finder of fact as the legal
and moral representative of the community.
Complaints about erroneous insanity acquittals
are factually exaggerated because the incidence of
such acquittals is low and the complaints are speculative. There is no reason to believe that the insanity
defense is particularly prone to error compared with
other, equally indeterminate, value-laden criminal
law doctrines. The wrong-verdict argument does not
provide a legitimate policy reason for abolishing the
insanity defense.

Beating the Rap
Few defendants who are actually legally sane in
some objective sense beat the rap with the insanity
defense. Experts using the proper diagnostic tools
can reliably distin~uish people who are faking major
mental disorder. 3 Further, it is best estimated that
the insanity defense is raised in less than one percent
of federal and state trials and is rarely successful38·40
(Ref. 39, pp 361-6). The complaint that this defense
allows a large number of guilty criminals to avoid
conviction and punishment is simply unfounded.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike generally recognize that insanity is a defense of last resort that
betokens an otherwise weak defense and that rarely
succeeds. Insanity acquittals are far too infrequent to
communicate the message that the criminal justice
system is soft or fails to protect society. It is impossible to measure precisely the symbolic value of these
acquittals, but it is also hard to believe that they have
much impact on social or individual perceptions. So
few insanity pleas succeed that neither aspiring criminals nor society assumes that conviction and punishment will be averted by raising the defense.
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If the defendant is genuinely legally insane and
succeeds with the defense, he deserves to be acquitted
and has not beaten the rap at all. The tough-on-crime
justification that underlies this argument is based on
a fundamental misconception about the meaning of
an insanity acquittal. In successful insanity defenses,
the prima facie case for guilt has been established, and
the verdict thus announces that the defendant's conduct was wrong. Nonetheless, the defendant did not
deserve blame and punishment and will be confined
by commitment.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Conclusion

Until the latter part of the 20th century, all American jurisdictions had some version of the insanity
defense. Even now, only four states deny defendants
the use of the defense. The affirmative defense of
legal insanity has such a strong historical, moral, and
practical pedigree and is so widely accepted that providing it is a matter of fundamental fairness in a just
society. Jurisdictions have substantial leeway to decide what test best meets their legal and moral policies, but some form of affirmative defense is a prerequisite of justice, and its constitutional status under
the Due Process Clause should be explicitly recognized. It is part of the legal tradition and collective
conscience of the nation. Further, no alternative will
achieve equal justice by other means.
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24.
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26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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